Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.823505
Title: A scalable cooperative game theoretic framework for coalitional energy management
Author: Han, Liyang
ISNI:       0000 0005 0291 5180
Awarding Body: University of Oxford
Current Institution: University of Oxford
Date of Award: 2020
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Abstract:
The advances in distributed energy resources (DER) propelled power networks worldwide to transition from a unidirectional model to a bidirectional one, under which uncertain and intermittent renewable generation cause load balancing issues. Energy storage as flexible resources have the potential to mitigate the stress on the network, and local energy markets emerged in recent years to encourage efficient management of these resources. However, the formulation of a market scheme that incentivizes such operation by offering profit for all the participants remains an unresolved challenge. This thesis proposes the novel application of cooperative game theory to coalitional energy management, which extends existing cooperative theoretic frameworks to the energy storage operation. The proposed scheme is then proven to have a non-empty core, ensuring the existence of a payoff allocation that incentivizes participation in the grand coalition of all participants. This thesis focuses on two main payoff allocations: the Shapley value and the nucleolus. The Shapley value is a commonly used payoff allocation in cooperative game theory, but is highly computationally complex. This thesis proposes a novel multi-step sampling method based on optimal stratified sampling for estimating the Shapley value, and demonstrates its effectiveness to improve the scalability of the proposed scheme. It is shown, however, that the Shapley value is not necessarily stabilizing, meaning that given the payoffs based on the Shapley value, some participants may choose to defect from the grand coalition and form smaller coalitions for higher profits. The nucleolus, albeit a less commonly used payoff allocation in cooperative game theory, is proven to be stabilizing, preventing defection from the grand coalition. Similarly, the computation time of the nucleolus increases exponentially with the number of participants, strictly limiting the size of this scheme. This thesis proposes a new strategy which incorporates clustering techniques to estimate the nucleolus at reduced computation times, where a novel marginal contribution profile is constructed as the clustering features. While maintaining a high estimation accuracy, it is shown to easily scale up the scheme from less than 15 participants to over 100, a well applicable number of load buses in a real distribution feeder.
Supervisor: McCulloch, Malcom ; Morstyn, Thomas Sponsor: China Oxford Scholarship Fund
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.823505  DOI: Not available
Keywords: energy market ; Game theory
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