Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.819341
Title: "Τὸ καλόν" is said in many ways : the homonymy of "καλόν" in Aristotle's philosophy
Author: Chapa Montes, Paola Minerva
ISNI:       0000 0004 9357 9524
Awarding Body: University of Leeds
Current Institution: University of Leeds
Date of Award: 2020
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Abstract:
Aristotle bestows great significance upon the teleological role of τὸ καλόν in many areas of his philosophy. Unfortunately, none of his extant works discusses the nature of τὸ καλόν, but he does say that “τὸ καλόν” can be said in different ways and is, therefore, homonymous. Based on the premise that “τὸ καλόν” is homonymous, and utilising different interpretations of Aristotle’s concept of homonymy, scholars have analysed various usages of the term in question in different contexts, and have proposed different meanings for it. However, none of the interpretations offered about Aristotle’s concept of homonymy take into account his methodical approach to identifying a primary meaning of a term “N” when “N” can be said in different and related ways. In this research, I survey different literary sources to learn ordinary uses of “τὸ καλόν” that were most likely known to Aristotle. Then, I show that Aristotle follows three basic steps for analysing problems involving homonymy of different types: 1. Establishing that it is indeed a case of homonymy (the corresponding meanings of the name “N” as predicated of objects x and y are different). 2. Establishing the type of homonymy by explaining why both x and y bear the same name “N”. I shall elaborate on the different types we can identify throughout Aristotle’s works. 3. In cases of connected homonymy, identifying the primary N in relation to which the other objects are called “N”. Based on this interpretation of Aristotelian homonymy, I contend that Aristotle’s account in Met. 1078a31-b6 –where he claims that τὸ καλόν is a final cause, and that its greatest forms are order, due measure (due proportion, or symmetry), and definiteness– is quite likely a general account of the nature of τὸ καλόν and can, therefore, provide the primary meaning of “τὸ καλόν”.
Supervisor: Jamie, Dow ; Christopher, Megone Sponsor: University of Leeds
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.819341  DOI: Not available
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