This thesis is about the allocation of benefits under scarcity constraints. In five standalone papers, it provides answers to some aspects of the following central question of distributive ethics: Out of a set of distributions of well-being over a group of individuals, which distribution should we choose? The first of the five papers draws a connection between the moral notions of interpersonal aggregation and equality. It argues that aggregation sceptics should be egalitarians. The second paper puts forward a novel model of “limited aggregation” that is not subject to the same objections that have recently been raised against other such models. The third paper criticizes one of the most influential views of cashing out non-aggregative ethics under conditions of risk, “ex ante contractualism.” The fourth paper defends an ex post approach as an alternative to ex ante contractualism. The fifth and final paper tries to incorporate some of our common-sense moral intuitions into a coherent theory of variable population ethics. It does so by combining reasons stemming from an impersonal axiology with reasons stemming from the complaints people can raise against our choices.