Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.801727
Title: Capability memory protection for embedded systems
Author: Xia, Hongyan
ISNI:       0000 0004 8507 6230
Awarding Body: University of Cambridge
Current Institution: University of Cambridge
Date of Award: 2020
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Abstract:
This dissertation explores the use of capability security hardware and software in real-time and latency-sensitive embedded systems, to address existing memory safety and task isolation problems as well as providing new means to design a secure and scalable real-time system. In addition, this dissertation looks into how practical and high-performance temporal memory safety can be achieved under a capability architecture. State-of-the-art memory protection schemes for embedded systems typically present limited and inflexible solutions to memory protection and isolation, and fail to scale as embedded devices become more capable and ubiquitous. I investigate whether a capability architecture is able to provide new angles to address memory safety issues in an embedded scenario. Previous CHERI capability research focuses on 64-bit architectures in UNIX operating systems, which does not translate to typical 32-bit embedded processors with low-latency and real-time requirements. I propose and implement the CHERI CC-64 encoding and the CHERI-64 coprocessor to construct a feasible capability-enabled 32-bit CPU. In addition, I implement a real-time kernel for embedded systems atop CHERI-64. On this hardware and software platform, I focus on exploring scalable task isolation and fine-grained memory protection enabled by capabilities in a single flat physical address space, which are otherwise difficult or impossible to achieve via state-of-the-art approaches. Later, I present the evaluation of the hardware implementation and the software run-time overhead and real-time performance. Even with capability support, CHERI-64 as well as other CHERI processors still expose major attack surfaces through temporal vulnerabilities like use-after-free. A naive approach that sweeps memory to invalidate stale capabilities is inefficient and incurs significant cycle overhead and DRAM traffic. To make sweeping revocation feasible, I introduce new architectural mechanisms and micro-architectural optimisations to substantially reduce the cost of memory sweeping and capability revocation. Another factor of the cost is the frequency of memory sweeping. I explore tradeoffs of memory allocator designs that use quarantine buffers and shadow space tags to prevent frequent unnecessary sweeping. The evaluation shows that the optimisations and new allocator designs reduce the cost of capability sweeping revocation by orders of magnitude, making it already practical for most applications to adopt temporal safety under CHERI.
Supervisor: Moore, Simon Sponsor: CSC Cambridge Scholarship
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.801727  DOI:
Keywords: CHERI ; capability protection ; embedded systems ; temporal memory safety ; RTOS
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