Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.792913
Title: Cold boot attacks on post-quantum schemes
Author: Villanueva Polanco, Ricardo
ISNI:       0000 0004 8500 6603
Awarding Body: Royal Holloway, University of London
Current Institution: Royal Holloway, University of London
Date of Award: 2019
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Abstract:
Cryptographic models are intended to represent an adversary's capabilities when attacking encryption schemes. Models often err on the side of caution by over-estimating the power of adversaries. However, several recent attacks reported in the literature demonstrate that measuring an adversary's potential is a difficult task. This thesis will view the cryptographic landscape from the perspective of an adversary and the implementer. We study how an adversary can take advantage of leaked information about a private key. The particular scenario we study is the cold boot attack whereby an adversary can procure a noisy version of the key (i.e. the extracted data will contain errors) from a computer's main memory. Such an attack is not traditionally modelled by the standard security games. We show how the adversary might recover the original secret key, and hence compromise security, for some lattice-based schemes such as NTRU and BLISS, as well as the signature scheme Rainbow, which is based on multivariate polynomials over a finite field, and finally the McEliece crypto-system, which is a code-based asymmetric encryption scheme. We mount our attacks against specific real-world implementations of each of these schemes. For each scheme, we will study it and review at least one real-world implementation of the scheme. Moreover, for each implementation of a particular scheme, we will concern ourselves with acquiring knowledge of and evaluating each of the formats used to store the scheme's private key in memory, and then propose specific algorithms for key recovery in the cold boot attack setting. Our approach to key recovery is general and based on the combination of key enumeration algorithms and other techniques. Basically, an original secret key is seen as a concatenation of multiple chunks, each of which has a fixed number of bits and takes multiple values. These chunks then are combined to produce candidates for the secret key. These key enumeration algorithms have been already used in other side-channel scenarios with a variety of different approaches being used to solving the problem.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.792913  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Cold boot attacks ; Post-Quantum Schemes
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