Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.789904
Title: Understanding testimony
Author: Nettel, E. P.
ISNI:       0000 0004 8502 4078
Awarding Body: UCL (University College London)
Current Institution: University College London (University of London)
Date of Award: 2015
Availability of Full Text:
Access from EThOS:
Full text unavailable from EThOS. Please try the link below.
Access from Institution:
Abstract:
I present and defend an account of how it is that we acquire knowledge from what others tell us and an account of what it is for us to understand the utterances of others that can sustain this epistemology. In Chapters 1 & 2 I present my account of how it is that we can acquire knowledge from others. I say that a speaker makes available irreducibly testimonial knowledge to their audience by voicing knowledge. Testimonial knowledge is a distinctive kind of knowledge that one can get by way of transmission from a knowledgable source. One voices knowledge that p when knowledge that p (one's own, or another's) contributes in the required way in a causal explanation of why one produced one's utterance. I defend the claim that, so long as a speaker in fact voices knowledge that p, then their audience can come to know that p by believing the speaker, regardless of what reasons they initially had to think that the speaker uttered truth or falsity. In Chapter 3 I show that the causal explanation of a speaker's linguistic behaviour will also appeal to expectations that the speaker has of their audience; expectations that they will have understood what speaker has done in so speaking. Understanding utterances is conceived of in terms of audiences meeting these expectations, by recognising what it is that the speaker thereby means to be doing. Chapter 4 contains a defence of a proposal provided by Ian Rumfitt, which conceives of such understanding as a state of possessing capacities to make inferences specific to the kinds of acts that speakers' (mean to) perform with their utterances. I end, in Chapter 5, by applying this picture of understanding to some historic debates in which the notion has featured, highlighting its explanatory advantages over some rivals.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.789904  DOI: Not available
Share: