Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS:
Title: Combined Omani-British strategy during the Dhofar Rebellion (1963-1982)
Author: Gunther, Michael John
ISNI:       0000 0004 7970 0826
Awarding Body: King's College London
Current Institution: King's College London (University of London)
Date of Award: 2019
Availability of Full Text:
Access from EThOS:
Full text unavailable from EThOS. Restricted access.
Access from Institution:
The Omani government defeated the communist-aligned Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) during the Dhofar Rebellion (1963-1982) by implementing a national policy to pursue a military strategy, supported by information, economic, and diplomatic efforts. The Sultan's government, aided significantly by the British and other Gulf states, set the conditions for military victory by integrating all aspects of national power to support a singular, local strategy. Most accounts of the conflict limit their analysis to the military aspects of the campaign, although in recent years a small body of work emerged on the diplomatic aspects of the war. However, to understand the complexity of the strategy required to win in Dhofar, all of its aspects must be examined before and after the coup that deposed Sultan Said bin Taimur in favour of his moderate son, Qaboos, in July 1970. The combined Omani-British strategy during the Dhofar Rebellion was an example of how to fight a war by integrating aspects of national power. Both states balanced national and regional interests to fight the insurgents. A strategic analysis of the war allows historians, strategists, and policymakers to reassess the narrative that Qaboos radically changed the direction of the war by embracing a 'hearts and minds' approach, the importance of Qaboos's diplomatic efforts during and after the 1972 Sarfait campaign, Said's efforts to plan and implement a modernisation plan following commercial oil production, the British contribution to the failure to develop a holistic strategy during Said's reign, and the actions required to secure Dhofar after the termination of major military operations in 1975. A comprehensive examination of the conduct of the war places it within its historical and cultural context and allows government leaders and historians to better understand the limitations of applying its lessons within the context of modern conflicts.
Supervisor: Hughes, Geraint Alun ; Chin, Warren Anthony Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available