Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS:
Title: Peer disagreement and total evidence
Author: Kwon, H.
ISNI:       0000 0004 7964 7535
Awarding Body: UCL (University College London)
Current Institution: University College London (University of London)
Date of Award: 2015
Availability of Full Text:
Access from EThOS:
Full text unavailable from EThOS. Please try the link below.
Access from Institution:
How should you respond to the disagreeing opinion of your peer? This question has been discussed under the name of "peer disagreement problem" in epistemology. In this thesis, I focus on this problem by assessing main views about it. In Chapter 1, I provide a paradigmatic peer disagreement case and explain some preliminary points for the later discussion. Then, I discuss the two major views on the peer disagreement problem, Total Evidence View and Equal Weight View. In Chapter 2, I explain and assess Thomas Kelly's Total Evidence View by distinguishing the two main claims of it, the requirement of Total Evidence View and the total evidence principle. I criticize Total Evidence View by showing that these two claims cannot hold at the same time by discussing several disagreement cases. In Chapter 3, Equal Weight View is discussed by examining arguments for it provided by Adam Elga and David Christensen. I explain and assess this view also by distinguishing the two main claims, the requirement of Equal Weight View and the independence principle. I criticize that the independence principle does not generally hold, based on Kelly's idea of the justified higher order belief with help from Jennifer Lackey's argument. Also, I argue that even in the cases where the independence principle holds, this principle does not plausibly yield the requirement of Equal Weight View if you are rationally required to take account of the original evidence again. In the final chapter, I conclude that the cases under the single title of "peer disagreement" are heterogeneous so that providing a general account to them by relying on a single intuition is far from viable.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available