Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.771755
Title: Bayesian rational models and human rationality
Author: Wolf, Jonathan
ISNI:       0000 0004 7659 7317
Awarding Body: UCL (University College London)
Current Institution: University College London (University of London)
Date of Award: 2018
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Abstract:
According to a large, influential psychological literature, humans are predictably irrational. Proponents of the heuristics-and-biases programme argue that our mental software leads us to diverge from elementary principles of probability and decision theory. Similarly, reasoning scientists have catalogued surprising human errors in drawing basic logical inferences. However, insights from Bayesian cognitive science appear to recommend a more optimistic evaluation of human rationality, highlighting our exquisite sensitivity to the statistical structure of the environment and the laws of probability theory. Does Bayesian cognitive science vindicate us of the charge of irrationality that the heuristics-and-biases approach levels? I argue that Bayesian cognitive science paints a picture of the mind-brain as more intelligent, more subtle, more sophisticated and more sensitive to context than that painted by heuristics-and-biases psychology, however it does not ultimately vindicate us of the charge of systematic irrationality that the heuristics-and-biases paradigm levels.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.771755  DOI: Not available
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