These essays are four independent contributions to scholarship on David Hume's and Immanuel Kant's metaphysics, epistemologies, and philosophies of mind. They converge on Kant's response to Hume's causal scepticism. By 'Hume's causal scepticism', I mean: first, Hume's doubt that we can cognise causation a priori (what Kant called 'the Humean doubt'); second, Hume's doubt that the justification of induction is rational (Hume's so-called 'problem of induction'). Essay 1, 'Hume's Alleged Lapse on the Causal Maxim', argues that Hume was prima facie justified in doubting the 'absolute' necessity for the impression of any event to be preceded by the impression of a cause. Essay 2, 'Kant's Humean Problem', argues that Kant, recognising the coherence of Hume's doubt that we can cognise causation a priori and not just empirically, took his own Transcendental Analytic to directly refute Hume's doubt. Essay 3, 'Kantian Objectivistic Nonconceptualism', argues that the 'nonconceptualist' reading of Kant's Transcendental Deduction-on which intuiting objects does not require applying a priori concepts-is incorrect because it does not directly refute Hume's doubt that we can cognise causation a priori. Essay 4, 'Did Kant Solve Hume's Problem of Induction?', argues that Kant offered resources for a limited solution to Hume's 'problem of induction', i.e., the demand to rationally justify our presupposition that any object or event resembling those perceived as conjoined with a specific quality is also conjoined with that quality.