Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.764339
Title: Value allocation under ambiguity
Author: Angelopoulos, Angelos
ISNI:       0000 0004 7655 4253
Awarding Body: University of Manchester
Current Institution: University of Manchester
Date of Award: 2015
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Abstract:
We consider a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information where individual behavior exhibits ambiguity aversion along the line of maximin expected utility decision making. For such economies we introduce different notions of maximin value allocations. We also introduce a strong notion of (maximin) incentive compatibility. We prove existence and incentive compatibility of the maximin value allocation, when the economy's state space is either finite or non-finite. In the latter case, we provide two different existence results: assuming first countable and then uncountable infinitely many states of nature of the world. We conclude that unlike the Bayesian value allocation approach, incentive compatibility is related to efficiency rather than to direct exchange of information.
Supervisor: Koutsougeras, Leonidas Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.764339  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Asymmetric information ; Maximin value allocation ; Incentive compatibility ; Efficiency
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