Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.755178
Title: Bad judgement : an essay in vice epistemology
Author: Crerar, Charlie
ISNI:       0000 0004 7428 1765
Awarding Body: University of Sheffield
Current Institution: University of Sheffield
Date of Award: 2018
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Abstract:
This thesis provides an account of the nature of intellectual vice. An intellectual vice is an aspect of someone’s character that makes them a bad intellectual agent, or bad knower. Previous accounts of the intellectual vices have tended to identify them with either the disposition to have bad epistemic motivations, or the disposition to produce bad epistemic effects. I argue for a new view that can overcome the difficulties faced by both of these accounts. According to this view, there are two distinct forms of intellectual vice: vices that involve motivations towards bad epistemic ends, and vices that involve some entrenched pattern of bad judgement.
Supervisor: Fricker, Miranda ; Holroyd, Jules Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.755178  DOI: Not available
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