Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.752441
Title: Essays on Bayesian persuasion
Author: Khantadze, Davit
ISNI:       0000 0004 7425 5719
Awarding Body: University of Warwick
Current Institution: University of Warwick
Date of Award: 2017
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Abstract:
Chapter 1 reviews the literature about the bayesian persuasion. It first describes two main approaches to bayesian persuasion: concavification approach and information design approach. Next I consider some extensions to the basic model of bayesian persuasion, like competition between different senders, privately informed receiver and dynamic bayesian persuasion. Some other contributions reviewed include costly bayesian persuasion and bayesian persuasion when receiver’s optimal action is only a function of an expected state. Chapter 2 deals with two-dimensional bayesian persuasion. In this chapter I investigate a model when the receiver has to make two decisions. I am interested in optimal signal structures for the sender. I describe the upper bound of sender’s payoff in terms of his payoff when only marginal distributions of two dimensions are known. Completely characterise optimal simultaneous and sequential signal structures, when each dimension has binary states. This approach extends concavification approach to bigger state space, than explored in previous contributions to bayesian persuasion. Finally I characterise optimal sequential signal structure when there are three states for each dimension. In chapter 3 I investigate together with my co-author the effect of absence of common knowledge on the outcomes of coordination games in a laboratory experiment. In our experiment, around 76% of the subjects have chosen the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy despite the absence of common knowledge. However, 9% of the players had first-order beliefs that lead to coordination failure and another 9% exhibited coordination failure due to higher-order beliefs.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Economic and Social Research Council ; University of Warwick
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.752441  DOI: Not available
Keywords: HB Economic Theory
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