Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.749428
Title: Finding time for God : an examination of God's relation to time through the metaphysics of the incarnation
Author: Paul, Emily Grace
ISNI:       0000 0004 7233 7059
Awarding Body: University of Leeds
Current Institution: University of Leeds
Date of Award: 2018
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Abstract:
In this thesis, I use the metaphysics of the incarnation as a lens for investigating how a Christian God relates to time. Parts (i)-(iii) deal in turn with a specific aspect, or element, of the incarnation. Each part examines whether and how a timeless (atemporal) and a temporal God, respectively, can account for that specific incarnational element. These elements are the Son of God ‘becoming’ incarnate; the incarnate Son being fully divine, fully human and a single person; and the Son’s glorification. I argue that a temporal God is compatible with all three of these important aspects of the incarnation. Comparably, if God is atemporal, I argue that although we can potentially make sense of the Son ‘becoming’ incarnate, we cannot account for the other two elements of the incarnation. Part (iv) takes a step back from these incarnational commitments, and considers debates about the nature of time itself: the relationism vs. substantivalism debate, and the tensed vs. tenseless time debate. I argue that in previous debates, substantival time has been assumed almost exclusively, and that construing time as relational instead looks promising for furthering the debate, because it provides us with a new and coherent sense of divine temporality. Regarding the tensed vs. tenseless time debate, I argue that atemporalists tend to assume that time itself is tenseless; and temporalists that it is tensed. I consider how God’s relation to time might look if we swap these traditional pairings around. I argue that a timeless God existing outside of tensed time is wholly untenable, but that a temporal God existing within tenseless time is perfectly coherent. This strengthens my argument in Parts (i)-(iii), because it provides the temporalist alone with the freedom to choose between tensed and tenseless time, whereas atemporalists have only tenseless time to work with.
Supervisor: Burley, Mikel ; Steward, Helen Sponsor: Cambridge University Press ; School of PRHS ; Leeds ; Yorkshire Ladies Council of Education
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.749428  DOI: Not available
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