Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.747427
Title: Thought in motion : on the possibility of practical reason
Author: Hinshelwood, A. J.
ISNI:       0000 0004 7230 6068
Awarding Body: UCL (University College London)
Current Institution: University College London (University of London)
Date of Award: 2018
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Abstract:
All intentional action involves practical thought, for the agent of intentional action represents the kind of action they do in a distinctively practical way: as a model or guide for their actual action. In the first instance, this thesis is about how we should conceive of the relationship between such practical thought and the particular intentional actions for which it is necessary. In this thesis I defend what I call the Identity Account. The account claims that there is a fundamental way of thinking that some kind of action is to-be-done, or is good-to-do, wherein one is and knows oneself to be doing that action-kind. In such cases, practical thoughts are intentional actions: a species of self-conscious change. I argue that other forms of practical thought are less fundamental than intentional action, and must be understood only relative to it. Standing in the way of the Identity Account is a certain conception of what a particular change is, which I call the block view. This entails a separation between practical thought and intentional action, and it puts out of the reach the possibility of the kind of self-conscious changes which the Identity Account says intentional actions are. I marshal a number of arguments against the separation of practical thought from intentional action, but ultimately press that the very possibility of a distinctively practical form of thought requires the truth of the Identity Account. In order to make room for the Identity Account, I elaborate an alternative conception of what a particular change is, which I call the Aristotelian view. By drawing on this, I show how self-conscious change, and so practical thought, is possible.
Supervisor: O'Brien, L. ; Lavin, D. ; Martin, M. Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.747427  DOI: Not available
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