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Title: A fairness-based astronomical waste argument
Author: Kaczmarek, Patrick Krystof
ISNI:       0000 0004 7232 3503
Awarding Body: University of Glasgow
Current Institution: University of Glasgow
Date of Award: 2018
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I defend a modified version of Marc Fleurbaey and Alex Voorhoeve's Competing Claims View that captures an additional consideration of fairness in the context of variable populations. I call this consideration `worthwhileness'. Part 1 goes on to argue that this view describes the expected value of a lottery in a way that is consistent with the axiological framework of Averagism. Also, I propose a novel definition of `overpopulation', and explain why considerations of fairness so-described by Averagism support our other moral reasons for avoiding overpopulating the world. In part 2, I design and run a toy model to determine which development policy-option is best in terms of satisfying the Competing Claims View. One of these options is ambiguous insofar as it combines two intuitions which have time and again proven themselves rather diffcult to jointly pin down. Putting them together forms what I will hereafter call, after its leading proponent, Broome's Intuition About Neutrality (`BN'). I argue that there is at least one combination of a (mathematically) well-behaved axiology and bridge principle that yields a moral theory which satisfies the normative reading of BN. Armed with all the right ingredients, we can now run the model. Based on some conservative assumptions, we find that we ought to take steps towards: (a) militating against the threat of a broken world; and (b) prolonging humankind's place in the stars (to some extent).
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available
Keywords: BJ Ethics