This thesis will examine the Electronic Warfare [EW] policies and subsequent Suppression of Enemy Air Defence [SEAD] postures of the Royal Air Force’s Bomber Command during the Second World War. It examines how EW was applied to the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) Integrated Air Defence System [IADS] so as to reduce Bomber Command aircraft losses, and determines whether EW policies were drafted in a proactive and/or reactive fashion vis-à-vis the Luftwaffe IADS. The thesis applies air power theory regarding the levels and methods of application by which SEAD was brought to bear against the IADS as a result of these EW policies. Ultimately, the thesis will argue that Bomber Command enacted both proactive and reactive EW policies at the Campaign and Localised SEAD levels using a combination of Manoeuvrist, Mass and Stealth/Surprise approaches.