Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.742217
Title: Perceptual non-evidential knowledge : an epistemology of perception from an Austinian perspective
Author: Anaya Ruiz Esparza, José Alfonso
ISNI:       0000 0004 7227 6129
Awarding Body: University of Warwick
Current Institution: University of Warwick
Date of Award: 2017
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Abstract:
The topic of this thesis is perceptual propositional knowledge. More specifically, the guiding question of this thesis will be, how do perceptual experiences figure in making knowledge of our environment available to perceivers? In general terms, the proposal that will be defended throughout this work is that perception figures as a source of reasons which can ground empirical knowledge. More specifically, we will defend the view that our perceptual awareness of the concrete entities which populate the world – entities such as blueberries, cats, the blueberry’s colour, the cat eating the blueberry, rainbows, shadows, etc. – affords us with reasons which have the potential to ground knowledge about those entities. The position I will be defending here has not received much attention in recent philosophical discussion. One of the things this thesis is set to achieve is to show that the relatively little attention this view has received is not justified. We will see that once the view has been fleshed out there are several discussions in the contemporary debate on perceptual knowledge which would benefit from engaging with the conception defended here – for the view can serve as the basis to advance original solutions to traditional problems.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.742217  DOI: Not available
Keywords: BF Psychology
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