Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.742018
Title: The nexus of control : intentional activity and moral accountability
Author: Conradie, Niël
ISNI:       0000 0004 7225 9329
Awarding Body: University of St Andrews
Current Institution: University of St Andrews
Date of Award: 2018
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Abstract:
There is a conceptual knot at the intersection of moral responsibility and action theory. This knot can be expressed as the following question: What is the relationship between an agent's openness to moral responsibility and the intentional status of her behaviour? My answer to this question is developed in three steps. I first develop a control-backed account of intentional agency, one that borrows vital insights from the cognitive sciences – in the form of Dual Process Theory – in understanding the control condition central to the account, and demonstrate that this account fares at least as well as its rivals in the field. Secondly, I investigate the dominant positions in the discussion surrounding the role of control in moral responsibility. After consideration of some shortcomings of these positions – especially the inability to properly account for so-called ambivalence cases – I defend an alternative pluralist account of moral responsibility, in which there are two co-extant variants of such responsibility: attributability and accountability. The latter of these will be shown to have a necessary control condition, also best understood in terms of a requirement for oversight (rather than conscious or online control), and in terms of the workings of the dual system mechanism. I then demonstrate how these two accounts are necessarily related through the shared role of this kind of control, leading to my answer to the original question: if an agent is open to moral accountability based on some activity or outcome, this activity or outcome must necessarily have positive intentional status. I then apply this answer in a consideration of certain cases of the use of the Doctrine of Double Effect.
Supervisor: Snedegar, Justin Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.742018  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Intention ; Intentional action ; Intentional activity ; Control ; Moral accountability ; Moral attributability ; Moral responsibility ; Reasons-responsiveness ; Elizabeth Anscombe ; Gunnar Bjo¨rnsson ; Dual process theory ; Quality of will ; Action theory ; Actions as processes ; Doctrine of double effect ; Ethics ; Decision making--Moral and ethical aspects ; Control (Psychology) ; Responsibility ; BJ1419.C7
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