Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.739445
Title: On the phenomenal, intentional and physical nature of Mind
Author: Estrada, Allan Arturo Gonzalez
ISNI:       0000 0004 7227 6794
Awarding Body: Keele University
Current Institution: Keele University
Date of Award: 2018
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Abstract:
The aim of this research is to provide a path to understand the phenomenal, intentional and physical nature of mind. Essential to the discussion of this thesis is the fundamental role that the phenomenal character of experience plays in the theory of intentionality. It is argued that both aspects must be understood physically as realized by a relevant brain state. I present an internalist view of the mind, in contrast with a more popular view in philosophy, representationalism, that is typically externalist. However, this thesis will argue in favour of a new exploration of the relation between consciousness and intentionality. Having gained some understanding of this connection at a conceptual level, and having explored the relevant empirical findings that support my view, a new understanding of the hard problem of consciousness will here be presented. The arguments will show that it is required to start with our phenomenology, and since our phenomenology will shape our representation, such phenomenology will be the basis of our intentionality and our understanding of the world. As a consequence, the explanatory gap, or consciousness’ hard problem, needs to be understood in another sense: the problem, as it has been formulated, is a misconceived problem.
Supervisor: Tartaglia, J. P. F. Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.739445  DOI: Not available
Keywords: B Philosophy (General)
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