Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.736227
Title: Peter Lamarque's aesthetic essentialism
Author: Shields, Mona Roxana
ISNI:       0000 0004 6499 4825
Awarding Body: University of Reading
Current Institution: University of Reading
Date of Award: 2017
Availability of Full Text:
Access from EThOS:
Access from Institution:
Abstract:
This thesis argues that the aesthetic character of some conceptual works of art can be determined by the possession of essential aesthetic properties. By discussing Peter Lamarque’s account of individual aesthetic essentialism one can suggest that conceptual works can be aesthetically investigated. Chapter I introduces the concept of the aesthetic and discusses Frank Sibley’s account of aesthetic concepts. Chapter II analyses in detail Sibley’s two fold relational character of aesthetic properties. Chapter III introduces Lamarque’s concept of aesthetic properties and it also insists on a distinction between artistic and aesthetic properties. Chapter IV introduces a general account of essentialism and then discusses Lamarque’s new object theory. Chapter V investigates Lamarque’s weaker version of individual aesthetic essentialism and analyses the distinction between essential and inessential aesthetic properties. Finally, Chapter VI considers the aesthetics of conceptual art and argues that some conceptual pieces have essential aesthetic properties. The philosophical discussions are supported by appeal to many different works of art, from traditional works to contemporary works. I conclude that all conceptual works have aesthetic properties but mostly there are inessential properties. My suggestion at the end of this thesis is more radical. A close analysis identified essential aesthetic properties in some conceptual works of art and this contribute to the aesthetic character and value of these works.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.736227  DOI: Not available
Share: