Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.733371
Title: NATO and coalition warfare in Afghanistan, 2001-2014
Author: Hanagan, Deborah Lynn
ISNI:       0000 0004 6497 9203
Awarding Body: King's College London
Current Institution: King's College London (University of London)
Date of Award: 2017
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Abstract:
This thesis analyzes the involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Specifically, it analyzes multinational military adaptation and change at the operational level within the ISAF coalition which operated in the midst of a complex conflict that changed in character over time. NATO was not initially involved in military operations, but this changed slowly over time. First, it decided to take over ISAF in Kabul, and then it expanded ISAF, both geographically and operationally. ISAF then surged, followed by an organized withdrawal. Why did this happen and how did ISAF maintain coalition cohesion throughout the campaign in Afghanistan? Despite a multitude of forces that should have frayed coalition cohesion, such as intra-alliance friction over burden-sharing, operational inefficiencies related to national caveats, reluctance to commit forces, especially to engage in combat, and a widespread perception the war was a failure, the ISAF coalition did not fall apart and contributing nations did not abandon their partners. Instead, cohesion endured, the coalition increased in size and expanded what it did, and NATO members and partners stayed engaged for some thirteen years. This thesis proposes an analytical framework comprised of two drivers, political will and organizational capacity, to explain this puzzle.
Supervisor: Honig, Jan Willem ; Gower, Jacqueline Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.733371  DOI: Not available
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