Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.730552
Title: The architecture of rights
Author: Frydrych, David
ISNI:       0000 0004 6498 1733
Awarding Body: University of Oxford
Current Institution: University of Oxford
Date of Award: 2015
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Abstract:
This thesis concerns the various concepts of rights and philosophical accounts of them. Chapter 1 addresses some methodological issues affecting analytic legal philosophy and the philosophy of rights. Chapter 2 distinguishes between two kinds of philosophical accounts of rights: models and theories. Models outline the 'conceptually basic' types of rights, their differences, and their relationships with other kinds of 'normative positions' (e.g., duties, liabilities, etc.). Theories of rights serve two roles: first, to posit a supposed ultimate purpose for all rights; second, to provide criteria for determining what counts as 'a right' in the first place. The chapter also criticises both monistic models (ones positing only a single basic kind) for being under-inclusive and a subset of pluralistic ones (those positing several basic kinds) as over-inclusive. Chapter 3 clarifies the concepts of rights exercise, enforcement, remedying, and vindication. Chapter 4 explains the Interest-Will Theories of rights debate, while Chapter 5 argues that its constituents are irredeemably flawed, unnecessary, and under-inclusive. Chapter 6 further analyses the concept of rights enforceability, showing why legal rights are not invariably enforceable by legal powers. It then explains why wholly unenforceable legal rights nonetheless constitute 'imperfect' or defective cases. Chapter 7 argues there are more ways to enforce legal rights than just via powers, elucidating two such modes: legal rights can generally be claimed or invoked using legal liberties in private and social circumstances. While Chapter 8 shows why it might not always be possible to make liberty-based claims or invocations of right, it also provides reasons for thinking that legal rights that cannot be enforced in these ways are also imperfect.
Supervisor: Eleftheriadis, Pavlos Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.730552  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Legal Philosophy ; Jurisprudence ; Philosophy of Law ; Rights ; Philosophy of Rights ; Hohfeld
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