Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: | https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.704837 |
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Title: | Analysing causation | ||||||
Author: | Morgan, Jennifer Margaret |
ISNI:
0000 0004 6057 3249
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Awarding Body: | University of Birmingham | ||||||
Current Institution: | University of Birmingham | ||||||
Date of Award: | 2017 | ||||||
Availability of Full Text: |
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Abstract: | |||||||
This thesis will survey several prominent approaches to analysing causation, discuss their differences and similarities, and look at a number of problems which are common to all of them. I will be arguing for the following claims about how we should approach the process of analysing causation. Firstly, I will be arguing that a reductive analysis is desirable, since if we can reductively analyse causation in terms of something empirically accessible, we can explain how it is possible to know anything about causation. I will argue that to reductively analyse causation is to find out what kind of facts ground causal facts. Secondly, I will argue, following Hall and Strevens, that there are two kinds of causation, causal difference making and causal influence. This two-tiered approach explains the cases where we are tempted to ascribe conflicting characteristics to our concept of causation. Thirdly, I will argue that causal influence grounds causal difference making and that it does so necessarily. That the grounding relation holds necessarily is important for defending the two-tiered approach against the objection that it would yield a disjunctive account.
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Supervisor: | Not available | Sponsor: | Not available | ||||
Qualification Name: | Thesis (Ph.D.) | Qualification Level: | Doctoral | ||||
EThOS ID: | uk.bl.ethos.704837 | DOI: | Not available | ||||
Keywords: | B Philosophy (General) | ||||||
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