The proposition of the thesis is, in its role as the lead offshore petroleum regulator in Ghana, the Petroleum Commission is not competent enough to oversee robust offshore health and safety regulation. Two accounts are developed to support this claim. First, the conferment of dual licensing and health and safety regulatory functions on the Petroleum Commission gives rise to a potential conflict. Secondly, even recognising a distinction between formal and de facto independence, neither is present in the Petroleum Commission. A number of factors justify these assertions: not least the fact that the law establishing the Petroleum Commission confers discretionary powers on the executive and does not provide regulatory independence as a formal requirement. In addition, the Commission's financial and administrative procedures are determinable by influences external to it. Formal independence is not, however, in itself a sufficient condition for the proper exercise of regulatory discretion. It is necessary for the regulatory body in question to be able in fact to behave independently, that is, to develop and take ownership of regulatory values, which in turn depend on the possession of relevant competence and expertise. Based on comparative analysis of global offshore regulatory regimes, and backed by empirical evidence, the thesis recommends legislative reforms in Ghana aimed at a functional separation of petroleum licensing from health and safety regulation.