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Title: The problem of truth
Author: Bretherton, Doreen Grace
Awarding Body: University of London
Current Institution: Royal Holloway, University of London
Date of Award: 1960
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The main point of this thesis is to show the relation between the concept of truth and the concept of intention. In Chapter 1 I give an account of what various writers have conceived the problem of truth to be, and have maintained that there are several different concepts of truth and that a complete philosophical discussion of the problem should explain and display the connections between the various concepts of truth and all other concepts to which they are related. Of these, the main problem that I have selected is that of the relation between the general concept of truth and the concept of intention, and asserted that this can best be understood by a consideration of the ways in which these concepts function in the course of linguistic activities. In the second chapter I have discussed what it is that is true-or-false, and have claimed that this is best identified as a sentence, which I have defined as a set of sounds or marks uttered by a human being in the course of a linguistic activity. True-or-false sentences are a sub-class of sentences, and are those sentences uttered in stating, asserting, denying, etc. Chapter III is a working out of the concept of "linguistic intention", which is defined as an intention which can only be achieved by the utterance of a sentence. The existence at some time of a linguistic intention is a necessary condition of linguistic meaningfulness, and in chapter IV I have argued that it is not a sufficient condition. Finally, I have claimed that the truth of a sentence uttered in stating, etc., can only be explained by considering the complex activities of which it forms a part, e.g. doing science. The truth of a sentence, when it is true, is constituted by the success of a linguistic intention, but linguistic intentions are not self-justifying, and their nature and what is involved in their success can only be understood in the wider context of scientific and other human purposes in talking.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Philosophy