Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS:
Title: A critical examination of Hume's epistemology with reference to its bearing on modern problems
Author: Maund, Constance
Awarding Body: University of London
Current Institution: Royal Holloway, University of London
Date of Award: 1936
Availability of Full Text:
Access from EThOS:
Access from Institution:
Although Hume's Treatise and Enquiry have usually been supposed to be concerned with metaphysical problems his statement of his object, his treatment of the problems he raises and the nature of the development from the Treatise to the Enquiry, suggest that his investigation should be regarded as epistemological, that is to say as concerned with investigation of the nature of what is apprehended by the different mental activities, perceiving, believing, knowing etc., which may be called accusatives, and with the relation of these accusatives to an external world. Such problems are regarded as being of particular importance by many contemporary philosophers. This interpretation implies that a discussion of Hume's philosophy must take the form of a consideration ox the light he throws on the nature of the accusatives to which he refers. It is first necessary, however, to distinguish between a sensation, which is not an accusative, and a perception. This distinction is of importance for Hume, even though he failed to make it, because it enables us to see firstly, that even the simplest accusative consists of distinguishable elements, and secondly that if there is a non-accusative sensation it can only be described in terms of something independent of mind and so does not concern the epistemologist. Hume's epistamological argument concerns the nature of simple impressions and simple ideas, of complex impressions and complex ideas, and the relation of the complex to the simple; the nature of the common sense object as it is apprehended by means of impressions or by means of ideas either of memory or imagination; the nature of concepts, the accusatives which though not themselves perceptions are apprehended as a result of perceptions. He also gives an account of propositions, which may be accusatives either of belief or of knowledge. Finally he shows how these analyses of accusatives enable us to estimate the validity of the evidence of our faculties concerning an external world.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Philosophy