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Title: The jurisprudence of 'ordinary language' : a study of epistemology in legal theory
Author: Roumeliotis, Michael D.
Awarding Body: University of Edinburgh
Current Institution: University of Edinburgh
Date of Award: 1993
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Part 1: The distinction between a social rule and convergence of behaviour does not depict the internal point of view regarding behaviour in traditional rural social groups. Nor does it depict how people actually behave. It is ideological, contingent on the modern era and the emancipation of the individual. It is a matter of the theorist's presuming a logic, a form of life, that stipulates what may count as a reason for action. Part 2: Linguistic jurisprudence, as ordinary language philosophy that it is, does not expect, regarding the conceptual, to find a reality independent of society and the happenstance of society's language. In a positivist fashion, it merely describes social reality. The distinctions it comes up with (and so the one Part 1 was about) are factual instead, part of the logic/ form of life of modern Western society. - Yet social reality is complex and many sided, not a coherent theory. Existing assumptions/distinctions in social reality/ language are contradictory and interminable. - Linguistic jurisprudence is not concerned with all assumptions that may exist as possibilities, only with the typical ones that form the network of assumptions, which communication presupposes. - There are many languages not one. Communication exists no more, even if Oxonian armchair philosophy keeps taking it for granted. - Communicating is not presupposing rules. It is changing them, adjusting them to the people we encounter. We are both the same and different, there are both many and one languages. It is all a matter of what we choose to see. The positive reality of any given aggregate will entail an infinite number of communities/ societies, and corresponding languages, along with their negations. Uncommitted description cannot take place (is interminable) without the adoption by the theorist of a logic, which cannot be found in the external reality to be described. Part 3: Language is not a matter of uncommitted observation of social practice, but rules in our minds. The theorist is not reporting social groups' languages, but examining his own.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available