As Zambia entered the 1980s with its economy continuing to weaken further at every turn, it eventually dawned on policy makers and implementers that the buoyant copper years of the previous decade and half may never come back. Although the country had stand-by-agreements (SBAs) with the IMF from as far back as 1973, there was still hope in the decade that followed that the copper-led problems were transitory. By 1983 these hopes could no longer be sustained, as the country's growth engine -copper - assumed impossible-to-ignore sputtering levels. In came the structural adjustment programme (SAP), whose inevitability and necessity this study completely identifies with. Among the major objectives of Zambia's SAP have been and continue to be: diversification away from copper by promoting non-copper, non-traditional exports; reduction or elimination of balance of payments (BOP) deficits; switching production from non-tradables to tradables and, ultimately, resumption of higher rates of economic performance. Reduction in the level of inflation, reduction in government budget deficits, and reduction in the level of unemployment have also occupied the front rank in the country's recovery efforts. This study - from a Business Policy background by a management scholar - has looked at the impact of Zambia's 1983-93 SAP on manufacturing sector business strategy. It uses as its main contribution, results of an empirical study of the impact of SAP on 43 manufacturing firms in Zambia. At the macro-level, the fundamental causes of Zambia's structural crisis are found to be quite diverse and complex. Some causes are rooted in history, some in nature, some in the external environment, and yet others in wrong domestic policies. Structural rigidities in the economy are found to be largely un-altered despite a 10-year attempt at adjustment. The economy is also plagued by what we have called here the 4-D Syndrome - that is Debt, Drought, Dependence on primary exports and imported raw materials, and Disease.