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Title: Moral hazard in a moderated-mediation framework of incentives and perceptions : a case study of the Higher Education Faculty in Pakistan
Author: Shoaib, Shandana
ISNI:       0000 0004 5364 1805
Awarding Body: University of Southampton
Current Institution: University of Southampton
Date of Award: 2015
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One of the by-products of the establishment of the Higher Education Commission in Pakistan is the introduction of an incentive regime for the faculty. The existence of explicit incentives is a usual feature of the corporate sector, as it sits well with the commercial enterprise model. Simply pulling out features of the commercial enterprise model and trying to fit it into the formal education system, without any sound bedding and preparatory grounds, could not be accepted by sanity to get suitable outcomes. The purpose of the study is to introduce the concept of moral hazard in a moderated-mediation framework of incentives, organizational justice perception, and reward expectancy to answer the research questions. To achieve the intended purpose, qualitative data were collected through semi-structured, face-to-face interviews from 19 top level management personnel of the chosen higher education institutions; using purposive sampling. NVivo 9 was used for analysis of the qualitative data. A detailed set of descriptive and inferential codes were generated, which were later braided into sub-themes and themes. Using the analytic strategies of pattern matching and cross-case analysis, a wide range of perceived moral hazards present in the faculty were revealed, along with the main determinants of this problem. The qualitative analysis also helped in the proper positioning of the constructs in the theoretical framework, as well as the operationalisation of the latent constructs used in the survey. Quantitative data collection followed the qualitative phase - using a survey. The proposed relationships in the theoretical framework were tested with a sample of 311 academics; using simple random sampling, via causal models and Structural Equation Modelling, and found that incentives might boost the apparent performance, but not necessarily the intended performance. The effect of incentives on the moral hazard tendency of employees has been confirmed by the results of both qualitative and quantitative data. The incentive problem surfaced up as one of the sub-themes in the perceived determinants of moral hazard. Moreover, the quantitative results confirm that disposition towards incentives has a direct, an indirect, and a conditional indirect effect on the employee tendency towards moral hazard. Examining the conditional indirect effect of incentives on moral hazard tendency serves the purpose of "critical realism", which looks beyond the occurrence of events by analysing the underlying causal mechanism of the problem of moral hazard in multitasking professionals. The results have important implications for managers, academicians, and policy makers for mitigating adverse behaviour in the employees, through proper use of incentives.
Supervisor: Baruch, Yehuda ; Nisar, Tahir Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available
Keywords: HD28 Management. Industrial Management ; LB2300 Higher Education