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Title: A study of logical paradoxes
Author: Intisar-Ul-Haque, Muhammad
Awarding Body: University of Edinburgh
Current Institution: University of Edinburgh
Date of Award: 1966
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By a paradox we understand a seemingly true statement or set of statements which lead by valid deduction to contradictory statements. Logical paradoxes - paradoxes which involve logical concepts - are in fact as old as the history of logic. The Liar paradox, for instance, goes back to Epimenides (6th century B.C.?). In the late 19th century a new impetus v/as given to the investigation of logical paradoxes by the discovery of new logico-mathematical paradoxes such as those of Russell and Burali- Porti. This came about in the course of attempts to give mathematics a rigorous axiomatic foundation. Sometimes a distinction is maintained between a paradox and an antinomy. In a paradox, it is said, semantical notions are involved and a certain "oddity", "strangeness", or what may be called "paradoxical situation", resides in its construction. The resolution of a paradox is therefore not simply a matter of removing contradiction, but also requires clarifying and removing the "oddity". On the other hand, an antinomy is said to consist in the derivation of a contradiction in an axiomatic system and its resolution lies in revising the system so as to avoid the contradiction. In discussing paradoxes and antinomies, we shall not be strictly bound by this usage of these terms: we use "paradox" and "antinomy" interchangeably. Indeed, from our point of view, even antinomies in an axiomatic system ultimately need semantic clarification and thus removal of paradoxical situations.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available