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Title: Time is (more or less) money : framing effects on intertemporal preferences
Author: Haynes, L. C.
Awarding Body: University of Cambridge
Current Institution: University of Cambridge
Date of Award: 2010
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Temporal discounting is subject to framing effects. In this thesis, a novel individual differences approach was used to investigate potential drivers of the outcome frame effect. In Experiment 1 (N=32), 4 new variants of the Kirby task were employed to demonstrate that substantial individual differences exist in susceptibility to the effect of both outcome frame and response mode on delay discounting. These individual differences were found to be relatively stable over a period of 9 months in Experiment 2 (N=14); the new variants were found to exhibit test-retest reliability comparable to the BIS-11 and BIS/BAS scales. In Experiment 3a (N=79), a novel eye-tracking task was developed to investigate whether patterns of attention allocation to monetary amounts and delays were related to the outcome frame effect. It was found that: steep discounters paid relatively more attention to monetary amounts than their associated delays; greater susceptibility to effect of outcome frame was associated with a greater discrepancy between frames in the attention to delayed monetary amounts. In Experiment 3b (N=79), potential behavioural/cognitive correlates of the outcome frame effect were investigated. Contrary to Loewenstein’s (1998) account of the outcome frame effect, measures of loss aversion were not associated with susceptibility to the effect of outcome frame. However, cognitive ability and cognitive style accounted for independent variance in the outcome frame effect. These findings are interpreted in the context of Stanovich and West’s (1998, 2000) argument that departures from normative responding may be related to individual differences at the algorithmic- and intentional-levels of cognitive analysis.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available