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Title: Strategy, intelligence, and British performance during the 1956 Suez Crisis
Author: Steed, Danny
Awarding Body: University of Reading
Current Institution: University of Reading
Date of Award: 2012
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Strategy and intelligence are words that enjoy heavy deployment in contemporary studies into war and warfare. They are held as critically important to the successful pursuit of policy and war and they are also held as critically important to each other; strategy functions better with positive intellgence support, and intelligence cannot function at all without the direction of strategy. Despite this obvious importance however, the relationship between strategy and intelligence remains under-explored, as neither Strategic Studies nor lntelligence Studies have sought to codify that relationship. lnstead those two sub-fields have been subject to "drivers" that have propelled the forward focus of those areas, drivers which have been focused on the empirical demand of the day. This thesis seeks to explore this gap and identify, codify, and operationalise the relationship between strategy and intelligence, before testing this model against a single case study, British performance during the 1956 Suez crisis, in order to observe the real world working and reveal broader insight into the relationship in practice. The relationship will be shown to be an inherently political activity that is also extremely dynamic as well as covering entire governmental machineries. That relationship is not perfect however, and the roles played by assumptions are a consideration of particular importance that carry significant consequences in reality. That reality in the fonn of the British experience during the 1956 Suez Crisis serves to reveal that although there is a model to explain and perhaps even imply a harmonious functioning of the relationship, the reality instead shows significant impediments to the smooth functioning of this relationship. By creating this model and then testing it against the real world practice of strategy and intelligence, it is intended to reveal that strategy and intelligence share a special but very fragile relationship in practice. 1
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available