Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS:
Title: Essays on adaptive learning
Author: Funai, Naoki
ISNI:       0000 0004 2748 4666
Awarding Body: University of Birmingham
Current Institution: University of Birmingham
Date of Award: 2013
Availability of Full Text:
Access from EThOS:
Access from Institution:
This thesis consists of three interrelated chapters on adaptive learning. In each chapter, I investigate the way in which adaptive decision makers/players behave in the long run. In particular, I consider subjective assessment maximizers; each player assigns a subjective assessment to each of his actions based on its past performance and chooses the action which has the highest assessment. They update their assessments adaptively using realized payoffs. I mainly focus on the following three cases; (1) an adaptive decision maker takes into account not only direct payoff information, but also foregone payoff information; (2) adaptive players face a normal form game with strict Nash equilibrium in each of infinitely many periods; and (3) adaptive players face a finitely repeated game in each of infinitely iterated periods. Then I show the conditions under which (1) adaptive decision maker chooses the optimal action, (2) adaptive players end up choosing Nash equilibrium strategies, and (3) adaptive players’ behavioural strategies converge to an agent quantal response equilibrium, which is a quantal response equilibrium for extensive form games.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available
Keywords: HB Economic Theory