Transitional justice has undergone tremendous shifts since it was first used in Latin American and Eastern European countries to address post-authoritarian and post-communist legacies of atrocity and repression. In particular, the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has increased the demand for prosecutions within a field that was previously marked by compromise and non-prosecution. While there are increasing expectations that countries with unresolved claims of human rights abuses should enact transitional justice policies, most of the literature on the subject largely omits to explain how elites from those countries choose among the possible options of transitional justice, and specifically, how they choose among international prosecutions, domestic prosecutions, and truth-seeking. Using case studies of Kenya and Uganda, this dissertation examines this decision-making process to understand how elites choose and reject different transitional justice policies. Theoretically, the research examines how preferences for transitional justice policies are constituted through “judicial statecraft”: the strategic efforts by heterogeneous, interest-pursuing elites to use justice-related policies as carrots and sticks in the overall contestation of power. The research finds that the choices of elites about judicial statecraft depend on three factors: the extent to which the elites are secure that their policy choices cannot be subverted from within; the cost and credibility of transitional justice threats; and the effects, both intended and unintended, of history.