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Title: Vacancy market structure and directed search
Author: Ueno, Yuko
ISNI:       0000 0004 2738 2301
Awarding Body: University of Essex
Current Institution: University of Essex
Date of Award: 2012
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This paper analyzes labor market frictions caused by heterogeneity among traders on the demand side (firms). Vacancy numbers per firm created at once can vary, and this heterogeneity affects the application probability of workers through the wage settings of firms, which determines the overall matching efficiency. I formulate a matching function that reflects vacancy concentration level in its efficiency parameter, and verify that concentration improves matching efficiency when its level is not so high, and such positive impacts can peak at an intermediate concentration level for the period of 1996-2005 in the Japanese regional labor markets (Chapter 1). In the following chapters, I examine whether this result fits the theoretical prediction. For this aim, I present a directed search model in which vacancy distribution among firms is asymmetric, in order to investigate matching efficiency and equilibrium wage levels. In Chapter 2, the model considers a monopsony market with two firms that have multiple vacancies each, while in Chapter 3 I extend the model to allow wage competition among more than two firms, using the framework of a dominant firm and competitive fringe firms. The models indicate that the derived equilibrium is generally not constrained efficient, and that matching efficiency can deteriorate with concentration, depending on the concentration level and worker-vacancy ratio. These results are consistent with my empirical findings of regional labor markets in Chapter 1. In the model of Chapter 3, the gap between the maximized output level in an efficient market and the level of the equilibrium is minimized in the case of intermediate concentration. Further, positive wage differentials are usually not obtained, but are obtained under certain market parameters.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available