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Title: Complex corporate ownership and control in UK listed companies
Author: Lotto, Josephat
ISNI:       0000 0004 2740 4021
Awarding Body: University of Strathclyde
Current Institution: University of Strathclyde
Date of Award: 2012
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This thesis sets out the empirical evidence on complex ownership and control using data for UK listed firms adapted from Faccio and Lang (2002) for the period 1996-1999. Using OLS estimation method, the thesis links corporate financial policies and performance with ownership and control. It reports a negative relationship between control concentration of the largest shareholder and dividend pay- out ratios in companies which separate ownership from control, and a positive relationship between ownership concentration of the largest shareholder and dividend payout ratios, in companies which do not. I show that higher control-rights grant larger shareholders incentives (lower cash-flow rights) and ability (higher control-rights) to extract private benefits, for companies which separate ownership from control. Supportive evidence emerges of a positive relationship between the largest shareholder's ownership concentration and debt ratio; when ownership concentration of the largest block holder increases, so does the possibility of collusion with management. It is further reported that, family companies employ more debt in their capital structures to prevent dilution of control and have significantly higher debt ratios and lower pay-out ratios than companies controlled by financial institutions. It may be argued that, the absence of strong external monitors makes it easy for family companies to pass control between generations. Finally, I test the relationship between voting rights of the largest shareholder and firm performance and report a negative relationship, suggesting reduction of corporate values. I demonstrate that firms whose control is shared among two family block holders accumulate more debt and perform worse than firms where the largest family block holder shares control with the second largest financial institution. This suggests that the incentives to collude with the largest shareholder or to monitor the largest shareholder are significantly affected by the type of block holder. It is also shown that firms with control coalition having more than two block holders perform better than those with only two block holders, especially those of the same type.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available