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Title: The problem of immanence in Kant and Deleuze
Author: Kerslake, Christian
ISNI:       0000 0004 2730 0599
Awarding Body: Middlesex University
Current Institution: Middlesex University
Date of Award: 2001
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In The Problem of Immanence in Kant and Deleuze, I reassess Kant's project in the light of its origins in Leibnizian rationalism. In his early works Kant seeks to ground the principle of sufficient reason as a 'real' rather than a 'logical' principle; it is this project that shapes his 'critical' formulation of the problem of the 'synthetic apriori'. I claim that Kant's project of 'immanent critique' never quite escapes the continuing requirement for metaphysical and teleological grounds, and that in the Opus Posthumum we find Kant returning to his rationalist roots in order to find a new relation between self, world and God, the three Ideas of reason. In parallel to this story, I argue that in his major work Difference and Repetition, the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze effects a return to Leibnizian philosophy (in pursuit of a new account of sufficient reason) which allows him to resolve in retrospect certain problems that arose in the unfolding of Kant's philosophy. My account is conducted on both historical and philosophical levels. From the historical point of view, I suggest firstly that Deleuze's return to the problematic of 'immanence' should be seen as providing an alternative transformation of Kantianism to the better known trajectory of German idealism, one that is more faithful to Kant's project in its historical totality. Secondly, I demonstrate how Deleuze's interpretation is facilitated by insightful readings of more neglected thinkers of the post-Kantian period such as Maimon, Novalis and Holderlin. Philosophically, the weight of the thesis lies with the extensive development of two themes. Firstly Kant's theories of ideas and intuition are interpreted from a Deleuzian standpoint, in order to provide materials for a theory of nonconceptual difference. Secondly, a new perspective is taken on the question of the primacy of self-consciousness in Kantian philosophy.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available