This thesis explores the complex relationship between aid and statehood using the case study of post-genocide Rwanda. Since the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has actively courted the support of particular donors, securing preferential aid relationships with some of them and becoming something of a 'donor darling.' The thesis uses the Rwandan case to examine how regimes become donor darlings and the effects of such a designation. Using the work of Harrison (2004) and Bayart (1993; 2000), I argue that the creation of a donor darling is a two way process; donors attempt to identify desirable qualities in recipient states, and African regimes actively market themselves in relation to donor priorities. The thesis will demonstrate that the Rwandan regime uses donor narratives on development, security and African statehood, to access aid, presenting itself as a potential partner in achieving goals of certain donors. Following Bayart. this can be seen as a strategy of extraversion. The thesis examines four areas of Rwandan regime policy: political space; ethnic difference: intervention in Zaire/DRC and peacekeeping in Darfur. These demonstrate a significant disjuncture between the regime's stated commitments to security and good governance and its actual policies. Despite this, donors have been highly reluctant to criticise the postgenocide regime. I argue that this reflects a donor concern with stability that may outweigh commitments to particular areas of good governance. Donors such as the UK have actively promoted 'post-conditionality' and 'African solutions to African problems,' emphasising the responsibility of African regimes for governance and security on the continent. However, I use the Rwandan example to argue that by heavily supporting donor darlings, donors are to some degree responsible for those regime's policies. Although they may wish to decouple aid from its effects, the Rwandan case shows this is unrealistic.