Through two major crises ln 1943 and 1944, the British Ambassador, Miles Lampson, backed by Churchill, maintained the practice of intervenlng to keep the Wafd in power against King Faruq's wishes. But that policy grew less and less popular in London, and the Wafd, sensing the change, chose to provoke the crisis which wrecked that mode of British control ln Egypt. One of the reasons for the change was British reluctance to be drawn into Egyptian party politics; another was the tactic of nationalist agitation, used by the parties in opposition to challenge the British and the parties in power. The nationalist claims and aspirations, thus formulated, came to constitute a challenge to British plans for the future of the position in Egypt; particularly so in the light of Egypt's post-war expectations and Egypt's new diplomatic horizons - the Arab League, the recognition of the Soviet Union, and expanding relations with the U.S. Following the assassination of Ahmad Mahir (whom they had means of influencing) the British found their hold on Egyptian affairs loosening, as his successor, Nuqrashi, adhered to a cautious but dogmatic interpretation of Egypt's national aspirations. The tensions which arose between the Ambassador and Nuqrashi came to a head early in 1946; and following the crist, which led to Nuqrashi's replacement by Sidqi and Lampson's replacement by Campbell, the British hoped to establish cooperation with the Palace. That hope was short lived; nor could the policy of seeking to encourage Egyptian goodwill - ~ pursued by Britain's chief negotiator in 1946, Lord Stansgate - resolve the difficulties created by the nature of Egyptian politics. Following the failure of negotiations, Nuqrashi came back to power; since intervention against him was ultimately rejected as impossible, the decisive confrontation took place at the U.N., where American attitudes denied the British government the victory it sought. The result was a stalemate.