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Title: The ethical intention of economic agents : the relevance of reward time preference
Author: Tseng, Lu-Ming
ISNI:       0000 0004 2674 2766
Current Institution: University of Exeter
Date of Award: 2009
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In Taiwan, most life insurance companies pay salespeople by a pure compensation scheme (i.e. no base salary is provided). In addition, life insurance companies may pay a large part of the compensation fee to salespeople immediately (e.g. 80% of the whole compensation payment) when the deal is closed. Such a scheme may encourage short-term sales, but may also generate some unethical practices (e.g. providing exaggerated information to customers). To try to overcome this problem. insurance companies offer a non-immediate reward scheme to salespeople. In a non-immediate reward scheme, salespeople receive a small part of the compensation in each period. Thus, salespeople could be encouraged to provide services to customers in the long term, and would become less short-term focused. However, it is open to the question: does a non-immediate reward system really promote ethical behaviour in life insurance selling or not? A comparative analysis of reward schemes requires consideration of time preference, a concept of which has not been given sufficient attention in business ethics and sales management scheme.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available