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Title: Essays on the financial governance of firms
Author: Wilson, Linus
ISNI:       0000 0000 4545 9174
Awarding Body: University of Oxford
Current Institution: University of Oxford
Date of Award: 2007
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Four essays, or chapters, model the capital structure, governance, and investment decisions as part of a sequential game. Each chapter is separate in its context, assumptions, and conclusions. The titles of the chapters are below. Abstracts of each essay or chapter can be found at the beginning of each chapter. The titles of the chapters or essays are as follows: I. Managerial Ownership with Rent-Seeking Employees, II. Financing Professional Partnerships, III. Sunk Cost Efficiency with Identical Competitors, and IV. Business Stealing and Bankruptcy. With the exception of Chapter III, which is meant to complement Chapter IV, these essays argue that the structure of financial contracts can affect the real behavior of firms. The first chapter argues that financial governance policies affect the behavior of rank-and-file employees. In Chapter II, the governance and capital structure of professional service firms affects clients’ expectations of the firm’s quality. In Chapter IV, the enforcement of financial contracts by bankruptcy courts affects the number of firms that enter and exit the industry.
Supervisor: Roberts, Kevin W. S. Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Financial economics ; Industrial economics ; Game theory,economics,social and behavioral sciences (mathematics) ; Finance ; bankrupcy ; capital structure ; CEO pay ; debt ; firm entry ; firm exit ; professional partnerships ; unions