Heidegger claims in Being and Time that philosophy has continually refused to take up the task of working out a 'natural' conception of the world. (One. where, for example, certain sceptical worries do not arise). My thesis argues that this task is one which emerges clearly from Kant's response to British empiricism - so that Kant's critical philosophy marks the emergence of a new kind of 'naturalism' in which the question of what is distinctively human about human animality is brought to the fore. What is still lacking in Kant, however, is the idea of our t~ching or being responsive to entities themselves which is registered, in Heidegger, by the idea of our 'attunedness'. But, the question of Dasein's precise relation to being human - or, the question of precisely who Dasein is - is problematised, for example, by cases of human children, the physically. disabled and non-human animals. I suggest that Ni~tzsche'sconception of the world as will-ta-power - whose basic unit is the 'drive' - is one which (already) provides the 'natural' conception of the world that (the early) Heidegger is loo~g for. I argue, with . constant reference to Camus' Meursault and Shakespeare's Juliet, that seeing the world as will to power means being able to affirm what the Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence asks us to affirm.