In this investigation, we attempt a systematic exposition and critical discussion of a form of ethical hedonism which appears in the Buddha's teaching in the Pali Nikayas, where it is maintained that there is no permanent soul in a person and that he is not identical with his consciousness or his body. An investigation brings out the intersection of our moral concepts and our concept of personal identity. We divide our thesis into two parts. In the first we discuss the problem of personal identity and the Buddha's negative views on the basis of personal identity. In this part, too, we show that, even given his view that there is no permanent soul in a person and that a person is not identical with either his consciousness or his body, the Buddha can account for personal identity. In the second, we consider the Buddha's moral position. This includes his arguments against the existence of a transcendental god whose commands would be taken as the moral law and the Buddha's criticism of ascetism and materialism. It continues with his view on happiness as the desired end of moral action.