This thesis is an attempt to give a workable account of 'God', to exhibit its logical status and to show how it can be introduced into language. The first chapter, after rejecting the view that 'God' is not a referring expression, notes the differences between various types of referring expression, and considers the objections to taking 'God' as a descriptive term, a title, and a proper name. It is concluded that 'God' is the proper name of a spirit, the objections to the other accounts being held to be decisive. The second chapter explores the notion of a spirit. The view that all persons must be corporeal is rejected and a concept of a person is developed which shows how it is possible for persons, both corporeal and incorporeal, to be identified and individuated. Finally it is shown how it is possible to predicate emotions of incorporeal persons. The third chapter shows how it is possible, given the nature of God, to fix the reference of 'God'. It is held that certain referring expressions have their references fixed by playing a role in such an interpretation of experience. Religious faith is shown to be such an interpretation of experience, able to fix the reference of referring expressions, because it has criteria for determining the validity of certain statements made within the interpretation. Finally it is shown how the reference of 'God' can be fixed within this interpretation.