This thesis identifies a number of weaknesses and omissions in the literature on juridification and responds in four main ways. Firstly, it introduces and defends an empirical definition of juridification as the governance of political or regulatory relationships by law and legal considerations. Secondly, it proposes and utilises a method of testing juridification, through a qualitative approach to indicators, and explores the utility of these indicators. Thirdly, it seeks to understand, through an examination of two case studies (the Commission for Racial Equality and the Office of Fair Trading) why juridification sometimes occurs and sometimes fails to occur. Fourthly, it explores the implications of the findings for the literature dealing with regulatory strategy. It is argued that the evidence of the case studies generally supports the regulatory strategy literature. Relationships between the regulatory agencies and their regulatees were generally characterised by informal contacts, with law remaining principally in the background. This general lack of juridification was, moreover, caused by the factors emphasised in the literature on regulatory strategies. However, this general support to the regulatory strategy literature is qualified by two exceptions - both areas of regulation which have been substantially affected by EC law. The exceptions suggest firstly that there may be cases in which juridification can occur despite a persuasive regulatory strategy, and secondly that persuasive regulatory strategy is not always the predominant strategy. The literature on regulatory strategies may thus require some revision.