This study deals with nuclear development and policies in Israel and the Arab States and the associated risks of nuclear war. It is an attempt to analyse and explain nuclear proliferation in the Arab-Israeli conflict area in terms of a behavioural model and motivations to go nuclear. It traces the development of the international nuclear industry since the 1950s using the product life cycle theory as an explanatory and likely predictor of the spread of nuclear technology to the Middle East. It charts nuclear development and policies in Israel and the Arab states and explains the dominant motivations which might drive these countries to develop and deploy nuclear weapons. It draws a distinction between nuclear technology spread as a technological and economic process and nuclear weapons proliferation as a politico-military process. It connects and interrelates technological and political factors of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East since proliferation is the product of technology and politics. The nuclearization of the Arab-Israeli conflict area entailed several risks of nuclear war. The study attempts to ascertain and assess the likelihood of these risks based on past experience and a survey of expert opinion. It identifies three levels of risks originating inside and outside the Middle East. The first level deals with nuclear risks in the Middle East. The second level focuses on the likely responses of the Superpowers to nuclearization of the Middle East. The third level discusses the impact of a nuclear conflict in the Middle East on the Superpower strategic balance. The implications of this nuclearization on the Arab Israeli conflict are discussed in terms of the nature of the conflict, the logic of deterrence and the risks involved. The evidence points clearly to nuclear proliferation increasing instability in the Middle East but not necessarily to a nuclear catastrophe.