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Title: Absolute-theory
Author: Naik, A. D.
ISNI:       0000 0001 3439 0973
Awarding Body: University of Aberdeen
Current Institution: University of Aberdeen
Date of Award: 1987
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This thesis is concerned with the project which J.N. Findlay has called absolute-theory (see his book Ascent to the Absolute London: George Allen and Unwin 1970, and his article 'Bradley's contribution to Absolute-theory' in The Philosophy of F.H.Bradley edited by Guy Stock and Anthony Manser, Oxford: Clarendon 1984). In absolute-theory one is concerned with (1) determining the abstract or formal characteristics, the form as it were, of the fundamental existent or existents on which all things depend, and (ii) evaluating the candidates that might be said to fit the abstract form. If there are a plurality of fundamental existents then the form is a universal with many instances. If there is only one fundamental existent, one primordial object, then the form itself is particular in the sense that it is not instantiable by more than one thing. The background issue is monism versus pluralism. In chapter 1 first some of the characteristics that go to make up the form are delineated. Then some candidates are briefly evaluated and rejected. Finally the kind of candidate absolute idealists offer in general is elucidated to some degree giving the authors preferred formulation. The self-differentiated Substance-Person. The rest of the thesis is concerned with elucidating this conception as a candidate and arguing for it. Through this the formal characteristics of the Absolute are also considered. The author has tried to formulate an independent and original position within the general tradition of absolute idealism. In chapter 2 the concept of substance and of ultimate substance is elucidated and argued for. In chapter 3 the substance-attribute distinction is utilized to construct an original dilemma and it is argued that the solution lies in the conception of the ultimate substance. The dilemma is this: All attributes are either essential or accidental to their substances. If interaction between substances is at the level of essential attributes loss of identity occurs. If it is at the level of accidental attributes knowledge of the real nature of other substances remains ever elusive. In chapter 4 it is argued that the ultimate substance is the source of all meaning and truth. In chapter 5 it is argued that the ultimate substance is also a self-differentiated Person. This is basically the idea that there is One Person embodied in all brain-bodies.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Philosophy of logic