Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS:
Title: Political economy models of conflict
Author: Moraiz, Francisco
ISNI:       0000 0001 3418 9890
Awarding Body: University of Surrey
Current Institution: University of Surrey
Date of Award: 2000
Availability of Full Text:
Access from EThOS:
Access from Institution:
We present a study of conflict from an economic perspective. We start by reviewing the approach to conflict in the economic sciences. We model conflict as a process of allocation of resources into two main technologies, production and appropriation. Then we complement this framework by allowing participants to negotiate. We introduce models of bargaining with complete and incomplete information. We incorporate the cost of conflict and this ensures that negotiated settlements always produce a more efficient outcome. The possibility of conflict arises as a result of incomplete information, which takes the form of informational asymmetry about the cost of conflict. We find endogenous war equilibrium outcomes and compare the outcome of optimal resource equilibria with arbitrary non-equilibria allocations. We also present some empirical evidence in the literature supporting the choice of utility models of conflict and present new results showing support for our propositions.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Resource allocation; Negotiation; Bargaining