The 1962 revolution in Yemen represented the attempt of trained officers in the regular army to shake off their inferior position and assume the political relevancy they felt entitled to. Externally, they were reasonably sure of Egyptian intervention on their behalf. Internally, they perceived an erosion of support for the Imamic regime which led them to anticipate massive popular following for the revolution once it broke out. After Syria's secession in September 1961 the U.A.R. enacted a hard-line anti-reactionary role. Saudi Arabia adopted an anti-Socialist role. A situation of confrontation ensued. When the Yemeni revolution broke out relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia were worse than ever before. President Nasser perceived the revolution as a progressive, popular pro-Egyptian movement which was threatened by a concerted Imperialist-reactionary effort. As political support proved insufficient, President Nasser dispatched arms and advisers. This in turn was not enough and combat troops were sent. In one month the number of Egyptian troops in Yemen jumped from one hundred to an estimated four thousand. King Sand perceived the revolution as an Egyptian engineered mutiny which would give Egypt a foothold on the Arabian Peninsula and encourage subversion. He classified it as a threat to Saudi Arabia. Political support to the Royalists was deemed insufficient. The commitment of troops was neither practicable nor desirable. Saudi Arabia intervened by subsidizing the Royalists, supplying them with arms and allowing them to use Saudi territory. The first part of this study analyzes the Imamic regime and the revolution that destroyed it. The second part deals with past relations among Yemen, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The third and fourth parts examine, respectively, the Egyptian and Saudi interventions.